How Infostealers Pillaged the World’s Passwords


Infostealer malware is swiping millions of passwords, cookies, and search histories. It’s a gold mine for hackers—and a disaster for anyone who becomes a target.

For the past two months, cybercriminals have advertised for sale hundreds of millions of customer records from major companies like Ticketmaster, Santander Bank, and AT&T. And while massive data breaches have been a fact of life for more than a decade now, these recent examples are significant, because they are all connected. Each victim company was a customer of the cloud data storage firm Snowflake and was compromised not through a sophisticated hack, but because attackers had login credentials for each victim company’s Snowflake accounts—a data-stealing spree that impacted at least 165 Snowflake customers.

Attackers didn’t grab this trove of logins by directly breaching Snowflake or through a targeted supply chain attack. Instead, they found the credentials in a hodgepodge of stolen data grabbed haphazardly by “infostealer” malware.

After years of operation, infostealers are having a moment. The malware, which often finds its way onto people’s machines through downloads of pirated software, can steal usernames and passwords, cookies, search history, financial information, and more from web browsers. This data collected by infostealers is increasingly being used by all kinds of hackers to compromise companies—and cybersecurity experts warn of more high-profile data breaches to come.

“We’ve seen nation-states leverage infostealers, we’ve seen criminals leverage infostealers, and we’ve seen teenage hacking crews leverage infostealers,” says Charles Carmakal, chief technology officer of Google-owned cybersecurity firm Mandiant. Russia’s APT29 hackers and cybercriminal gangs such as Lapsus$ and Scattered Spider are among the many hackers using infostealers. Just days after the global CrowdStrike outage, hackers created a new infostealer in an attempt to capitalize on the chaos.

Infostealers are defined less by their technical capabilities and more by their role in the malicious hacker ecosystem. Of course, to minimally qualify, they must be designed to steal information. But what separates infostealers from spyware or other malware used in espionage or targeted data breaches is that infostealers are spread opportunistically and indiscriminately. They grab data from the browsers of whatever computers they end up infecting. Then the attackers who run them compile and organize this chaotic and largely random assemblage of data—often on a marketplace or in a public forum like a Telegram channel. It is only then that infostealer operators or their customers comb their haul for valuable credentials and access tokens amidst the massive amount of junk. Ian Gray, director of analysis and research at the security firm Flashpoint, says there are likely hundreds of variants of infostealers in circulation.

There are some account access tokens that would have obvious value for many types of cybercriminals. If a data dump included working login credentials for a corporate employee’s enterprise accounts, a ransomware gang, business email compromise scammer, or state-backed actor could use the access as a jumping off point to launch their attacks. But in addition to selling these prized details, infostealer operators maximize the value of the data they collect simply by making their stolen data available. Platforms like Genesis Market, which was taken down by law enforcement last year, and Russian Market, organize infostealer logs and even make them somewhat searchable so hackers who are looking to target more niche organizations or those who don’t have financial motivations can potentially find exactly what they need.

These platforms take cues in how they are designed and marketed from legitimate information and ecommerce services. Many markets and forums charge a subscription fee to access the platform and then have different pricing structures for data depending on how valuable it might be. Currently, Gray says, Russian Market has so much stolen data available from infostealers that it has been charging a low flat rate, typically no more than $10, for any subset of data users want to download.

“Organizations have become very good with their security, and people have also gotten more savvy, so they’re not the best targets now,” for traditional tailored attacks, Gray says. “So attackers need something that’s less targeted and more based on what they can make use of. Infostealers are modular and often sold on a subscription basis, and that evolution probably aligns with the rise of modern subscription services like video streaming.”

Infostealers have been especially effective with the rise of remote work and hybrid work, as companies adapt to allowing employees to access work services from personal devices and personal accounts from work devices. This creates opportunities for infostealers to randomly compromise individuals on, say, their home computers but still end up with corporate access credentials because the person was logged into some of their work systems as well. It also makes it easier for infostealing malware to get around corporate protections, even on enterprise devices, if employees are able to have their personal email or social media accounts open.

“I started paying attention to this once it became an enterprise problem,” Mandiant’s Carmakal says. “And particularly around 2020, because I started seeing more intrusions of enterprises first starting from compromises of home computers—through phishing of people’s Yahoo accounts, Gmail accounts, and Hotmail accounts that were totally unrelated to any enterprise targeting, but to me look very opportunistic.”

Victoria Kivilevich, director of threat research at security firm KELA, says that in some instances criminals can use cybercrime markets to search for the domain of potential targets and see if any credentials are available. Kivilevich says the sale of infostealer data can be considered as the “supply chain” for various types of cyberattacks, including ransomware operators looking for the details of potential victims, those involved in business email compromise, and even initial access brokers who can sell the details along again to other cybercriminals.

On various cybercrime marketplaces and Telegram, Kivilevich says, there have been more than 7,000 compromised credentials linked to Snowflake accounts being shared. In one instance, a criminal has been touting access to 41 companies from the education sector; another cybercriminal claims to be selling access to US companies with revenues between $50 million and $8 billion, according to Kivilevich’s analysis.

“I don’t think there was one company that came to us and had zero accounts compromised by infostealer malware,” Kivilevich says of the threat that infostealer logs provide to businesses, with KELA saying infostealer-related activity jumped in 2023. Irina Nesterovsky, KELA’s chief research officer, says millions of credentials have been collected by infostealing malware in recent years. “This is a real threat,” Nesterovsky says.

Carmakal says there are multiple steps companies and individuals can take to protect themselves from the threat of infostealers and their aftereffects, including using antivirus or EDR products to detect malicious activity. Companies should be strict on enforcing multifactor authentication across their users, he says. “We try to encourage people to not synchronize passwords on their corporate devices with their personal devices,” Carmakal adds.

The use of infostealers has been working so well that it is all but inevitable that cybercriminals will look to replicate the success of compromise sprees like Snowflake and get creative about other enterprise software services that they can use as entry points for access to an array of different customer companies. Carmakal warns that he expects to see this result in more breaches in the coming months. “There’s no ambiguity about this,” he says. “Threat actors will start hunting for infostealer logs, and looking for other SaaS providers, similar to Snowflake, where they log in and steal data, and then extort those companies.”

Source: https://www.wired.com/story/infostealer-malware-password-theft/

The Aftermath of the WordPress.org Supply Chain Attack: New Malware and Techniques Emerge

On Monday June 24th, 2024 the Wordfence Threat Intelligence team was made aware of the presence of malware in the Social Warfare plugin in the WordPress.org plugin repository. After adding the malicious code to the Wordfence Threat Intelligence Database and examining it, they discovered additional affected plugins and continued monitoring the situation throughout the week. More plugins were affected prior to WordPress.org forcing a password reset.

Malware signatures were written by Wordfence analysts the same day as the initial notification of compromise and were released for our paid Wordfence users on June 25, 2024. Free users received the same signatures with a 30 day delay on July 25, 2024. Additional malware signatures were released over the days and weeks that followed to address new malware variants.

In today’s blog post we will provide a closer look into how the malware has evolved and update you on what to look out for if you suspect your site might be affected.

A New Technique: Credential Exfiltration

On July 14, 2024, an affected WordPress agency with a significant number of sites reached out to us after suffering from a major infection as a result of the supply chain attack when their Blaze Widget and Social Warfare plugins were updated. Unaware of this compromise, they noticed several rogue Administrator user accounts on several of their websites days later.

Upon further investigation, they discovered the intrusion vector and shared a malware sample with the team at Wordfence that was found in the plugins directory of one of their sites. It was configured to send data to the IP address 94.156.79.8, the same address that was at the heart of the supply chain attack and serves as a data gathering hub for the malicious actors, who also use it to host malicious scripts.

When Wordfence first encountered the IP address in conjunction with the supply chain attack, they marked it as malicious in their Threat Intelligence platform. The presence of the IP Address in a PHP file should result in a scan alert during properly configured Wordfence scans. This is true for all Wordfence users.

A Rogue Plugin: Custom Mail SMTP Checker

A rogue plugin named Custom Mail SMTP Checker was found on one of this agency’s websites.

When malware was originally added to several repository plugins last month, the primary purpose was to spread the infection to other sites, inject crypto malware and retain admin access to infected sites. Conversely, the purpose of the above referenced script is to exfiltrate SMTP credentials used by WP Mail SMTP, a plugin with more than 3 million installs.

We want to stress that this does not imply that the WP Mail SMTP plugin is vulnerable – especially since the current version stores the SMTP password in encrypted form out of the box (as of version 2.5.0, released in October, 2020) – with a key that is stored in a different table entry. The code above only exfiltrates an encrypted password from the WP Mail SMTP plugin.

Although an encrypted password is of limited use, the malicious actors likely already have access to an admin account and would be able to retrieve the encryption key via alternate routes. Another possibility is that this script is still going through testing like we had observed in the original supply chain attack. In that case we should expect other variants of this piece of malware to surface that will take care of the decryption before sending the data back.

Considering the fact that the stored SMTP password should be encrypted on most – if not all – sites, the impact of this script sending data to the malicious actors’ server is likely to be minimal. However, if you find this malware on your site and use this plugin or have used it in the past, we strongly suggest that you change your email password immediately and perform a thorough site clean.

If an attacker manages to gain access to credentials of an active email account, they may use such an account to send spam, and may also be able to reset passwords of websites and services where the email is used. This serves as a good reminder to only use accounts that are created specifically for the purpose of sending emails from your website as opposed to general purpose email accounts that are also used for banking and other sites.

More Malware Variants: WooCommerce Order Info and Braintree API Info Stealer

While reviewing malware scan results and doing additional research, the Wordfence team discovered another new piece of malware reported by Terence Eden via social network Mastodon who also noticed the rogue Custom Mail SMTP Checker plugin on one of their sites.

The second exfiltration script is intended to steal WooCommerce order information.

In his sample, orders are collected via the get_woocommerce_orders_summary() function. Next, some site information is collected, including domain, admin username and password as we have seen before. The order data, if any, is bundled with the admin credentials and sent off to the attacker-controlled IP address.

The Braintree information stealer was later discovered via one of the Wordfence malware signatures and works along similar lines, but of course gathers Braintree API information.

The potential impact of these two pieces of malware includes leaking sensitive information about customers as well as payment-related information for external services.

Indicators of Compromise

If you suspect that your site might be infected with remnants of the initial supply chain attack or newer strains of the malware, an obvious sign that something is amiss is the presence of the IP address 94.156.79.8. If you find this IP in one of your site’s PHP files, or if it is detected during a Wordfence scan, you can be fairly certain that some sensitive information is being exfiltrated from your site and sent to the attackers.

File names to look out for include:

  • /wp-content/plugins/informative/testplugingodlike.php
  • /wp-content/plugins/core_plug/godlikeplug8.php
  • /wp-content/plugins/braintree-api-key-sender3/braintree-api-key-sender.php
  • /wp-content/plugins/hello-world/`xg.php
  • /wp-content/plugins/hello-world/hello-world.php
  • /wp-content/plugins/custom-mail-smtp-checker/custom-mail-smtp-checker.php

These plugin names may vary and will likely change over time, but so far the IP is a good indicator that the code surrounding it is malicious.

Additionally, Wordfence reports seeing that include statements for malicious cryptomining JavaScript are injected directly into cached pages in some cases. If you are using a caching plugin and perform a properly configured Wordfence scan on those cached pages, you should receive an alert for the above IP address. We recommend clearing your cache once a full site clean has been completed.

Important IPs

94.156.79.8 – Malicious IP address controlled by the threat actor(s), which is used to host malicious JavaScript and as an information gathering server.

Suspicious Admin Usernames

The usernames PluginAUTH, PluginGuest, and Options were used for administrative users created during the initial supply chain attack.

Additionally, Terence Eden reported usernames such as aaBGFtd, aaCmiuz and others that appear to be randomly generated. Some sites might see thousands of those user accounts.

We recommend checking for their presence and removing them if they are not legitimate.

Source and more details: https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2024/07/the-aftermath-of-the-wordpress-org-supply-chain-attack-new-malware-and-techniques-emerge/

WordPress 6.6.1 Maintenance Release

WordPress 6.6.1 is now available!

This minor release features 7 bug fixes in Core and 9 bug fixes for the Block Editor. You can review a summary of the maintenance updates in this release by reading the Release Candidate announcement.

WordPress 6.6.1 is a short-cycle release. The next major release will be version 6.7 planned for November 2024.

Source and details: https://wordpress.org/news/2024/07/wordpress-6-6-1-maintenance-release/

10,000 WordPress Sites Affected by High Severity Vulnerabilities in BookingPress WordPress Plugin

On July 2nd, 2024, during the 0-day Threat Hunt Promo of the WordFence Bug Bounty Program received a submission for an Arbitrary File Read to Arbitrary File Creation vulnerability in BookingPress, a WordPress plugin with over 10,000 active installations. This vulnerability makes it possible for authenticated threat actors to create arbitrary files populated with content of files from local or remote sources, allowing the execution of any PHP code in those files or the exposure of sensitive information. We later received a submission for an Arbitrary Options Update and Arbitrary File Upload vulnerability in the BookingPress plugin from another researcher. This vulnerability enables threat actors to update arbitrary options which can easily be leveraged for privilege escalation, and enables threat actors to upload arbitrary files which can be used for remote code execution.

Props to Arkadiusz Hydzik and shaman0x01, who discovered and responsibly reported these vulnerabilities through the Wordfence Bug Bounty Program. These researchers respectively earned bounties of $537.00 and $488.00 for their discoveries during the 0-day Threat Hunt Promo. Our mission is to Secure the Web, which is why we are investing in quality vulnerability research and collaborating with researchers of this caliber through our Bug Bounty Program. We are committed to making the WordPress ecosystem more secure, which ultimately makes the entire web more secure.

Paid Wordfence users received a firewall rule to protect against any exploits targeting the Arbitrary File Read to Arbitrary File Creation vulnerability on July 8, 2024, and against the Arbitrary Options Update and Arbitrary File Upload vulnerability on July 12, 2024. Sites using the free version of Wordfence will receive the same protection 30 days later on August 7, 2024, and on August 11, 2024.

Wordfence provided full disclosure details to the BookingPress Team on July 4, 2024, and on July 10, 2024. The developer released a patch on July 12, 2024. We would like to commend the BookingPress Team for their prompt response and timely patch.

We urge users to update their sites with the latest patched version of BookingPress, which is version 1.1.6, as soon as possible.

Source and more details: https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2024/07/10000-wordpress-sites-affected-by-high-severity-vulnerabilities-in-bookingpress-wordpress-plugin

Choosing a PIN

We all have PINs for various online services… But have you ever thought about how common your PIN is compared to anyone else’s? You can bet that hackers have!

The folks at DataGenetics analyzed 3.4 million accounts from multiple data breaches, and put together this interesting graphic.

Check your PIN. The lighter the color, the more common it is (and the easier to guess). Notice how many are using dates – especially birth date or birth year, and how many just repeat two digits (4141 or 8484).

Want to update to a more secure PIN? Go for one of the black ones!

Define: Hash

Password verification commonly relies on cryptographic hashes. Hashing refers to the process of running the password through one or more processes to create a unique value (hash) for that password. WordPress never saves the password, only the hash.

Storing all user passwords as cleartext can result in a massive security breach if the password file is compromised. One way to reduce this danger is to only store the hash digest of each password. To authenticate a user, the password presented by the user is hashed and compared with the stored hash. A password reset method is required when password hashing is performed; original passwords cannot be recalculated or retrieved from the stored hash value.

A password hash also requires the use of a large random, non-secret salt value which can be stored with the password hash. The salt is hashed with the password, altering the password hash mapping for each password, thereby making it infeasible for an adversary to store tables of precomputed hash values to which the password hash digest can be compared or to test a large number of purloined hash values in parallel.

Rather than store plain user passwords, controlled access systems (such as WordPress) frequently store the hash of each user’s password in a file or database rather than the actual password. When someone requests access, the password they submit is hashed and compared with the stored value. If the database is stolen (an all too frequent occurrence), the thief will only have the hash values, not the actual passwords.

Passwords can sometimes still be retrieved by an attacker from the hashes, because most people choose passwords in predictable ways. Lists of common passwords are widely circulated and many passwords are short enough that even all possible combinations may be tested if calculation of the hash does not take too much time.

A number of the vulnerability reports you’ll read on this site refer to plugins or themes which allow attackers to bypass the hashing security measures.

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_hash_function and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_derivation_function#Password_hashing

Unauthenticated Privilege Escalation in Profile-Builder plugin

During a routine audit of various WordPress plugins, we identified some issues in Profile Builder and Profile Builder Pro (50k+ active installs). Researchers discovered an Unauthenticated Privilege Escalation Vulnerability which could allow attackers to gain administrative access without having any kind of account on the targeted site and perform unauthorized actions.

This vulnerability was fixed on July 11th, with version 3.11.9. All ProtectYourWP.com clients who use this plugin have been updated.

Source and more details: https://wpscan.com/blog/unauthenticated-privilege-escalation-in-profile-builder-plugin/

7,000 WordPress Sites Affected by Privilege Escalation Vulnerability in ProfileGrid WordPress Plugin

On June 27th, 2024, during the 0-day Threat Hunt Promo of the Wordfence Bug Bounty Program, we received a submission for a Privilege Escalation vulnerability in ProfileGrid, a WordPress plugin with more than 7,000 active installations. This vulnerability makes it possible for an authenticated attacker, with subscriber-level access and above, to grant themselves administrative privileges by updating user metadata.

Props to Tieu Pham Trong Nhan (aptx4869) who discovered and responsibly reported this vulnerability through the Wordfence Bug Bounty Program. This researcher earned a bounty of $488.00 for this discovery during the 0-day Threat Hunt Promo.

Paid Wordfence users received a firewall rule to protect against any exploits targeting this vulnerability on July 3, 2024. Sites using the free version of Wordfence will receive the same protection 30 days later on August 2, 2024.

Wordfence contacted Metagauss on July 1, 2024, and received a response on July 2, 2024. After providing full disclosure details, the developer released a patch on July 3, 2024. We would like to commend Metagauss for their prompt response and timely patch.

We urge users to update their sites with the latest patched version of ProfileGrid, which is version 5.9.0, as soon as possible.

Source and more details: https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2024/07/7000-wordpress-sites-affected-by-privilege-escalation-vulnerability-in-profilegrid-wordpress-plugin

150,000 WordPress Sites Protected Against Arbitrary File Upload Vulnerability Patched in Modern Events Calendar WordPress Plugin

On May 20th, 2024, during the Wordfence Bug Bounty Extravaganza, we received a submission for an Arbitrary File Upload vulnerability in Modern Events Calendar, a WordPress plugin with more than 150,000 estimated active installations. This vulnerability makes it possible for authenticated users such as subscribers to upload arbitrary files to a vulnerable site and achieve remote code execution.

Props to Foxyyy who discovered and responsibly reported this vulnerability through the Wordfence Bug Bounty Program. This researcher earned a bounty of $3,094.00 for this discovery during our Bug Bounty Program Extravaganza.

Paid Wordfence users received a firewall rule to protect against any exploits targeting this vulnerability on May 28, 2024. Sites using the free version of Wordfence received the same protection 30 days later on June 27, 2024.

Wordfence contacted the Webnus team on May 24, 2024, and received a response on June 14, 2024. After providing full disclosure details, the developer released a patch on July 8, 2024.

We urge users to update their sites with the latest patched version of Modern Events Calendar, version 7.12.0 at the time of this writing, as soon as possible.

Source and more details: https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2024/07/3094-bounty-awarded-and-150000-wordpress-sites-protected-against-arbitrary-file-upload-vulnerability-patched-in-modern-events-calendar-wordpress-plugin