15,000 WordPress Sites Affected by Privilege Escalation Vulnerability in Dokan Pro WordPress Plugin

On June 5th, 2025, we received a submission for a Privilege Escalation vulnerability in Dokan Pro, a WordPress plugin with more than 15,000 sales. This vulnerability makes it possible for an authenticated attacker, with vendor-level permission, to change the password of any user, including an administrator, which allows them to take over the account and the website.

Props to Foxyyy who discovered and responsibly reported this vulnerability through the Wordfence Bug Bounty Program. This researcher earned a bounty of $966.00 for this discovery.

Users of paid versions of Wordfence received a firewall rule to protect against any exploits targeting this vulnerability on June 10, 2025. Sites using the free version of Wordfence received the same protection 30 days later on July 10, 2025.

We contacted the Dokan team on June 9, 2025, and they registered on our Wordfence Vulnerability Management Portal for WordPress vendors on June 12, 2025. After receiving the full disclosure details instantly through the portal, the developer released the patch on August 6, 2025.

We urge users to update their sites with the latest patched version of Dokan Pro, version 4.0.6 at the time of this writing, as soon as possible.

Source and more details: https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2025/08/15000-wordpress-sites-affected-by-privilege-escalation-vulnerability-in-dokan-pro-wordpress-plugin/

WordPress Contact Form 7 Redirection Plugin Vulnerability Hits 300k Sites

High-severity vulnerability affects Redirection for Contact Form 7 plugin installed on over 300,000 WordPress sites

A vulnerability advisory was issued for a WordPress Contact Form 7 add-on plugin that enables unauthenticated attackers to “easily” launch a remote code execution. The vulnerability is rated high (8.8/10) on the CVSS threat severity scale.

Screenshot from Wordfence advisory showing 8.8 CVSS severity rating

Redirection for Contact Form 7 plugin

The vulnerability affects the Redirection for Contact Form 7 WordPress plugin, which is installed on over 300,000 websites. The plugin extends the functionality of the popular Contact Form 7 plugin. It enables a website publisher not only to redirect a user to another page but also to store the information in a database, send email notifications, and block spammy form submissions.

The vulnerability arises in a plugin function. WordPress functions are PHP code snippets that provide specific functionalities. The specific function that contains the flaw is called the delete_associated_files function. That function contains an insufficient file path validation flaw, which means it does not validate what a user can input into the function that deletes files. This flaw enables an attacker to specify a path to a file to be deleted.

Thus, an attacker can specify a path (such as ../../wp-config.php) and delete a critical file like wp-config.php, clearing the way for a remote code execution (RCE) attack. An RCE attack is a type of exploit that enables an attacker to execute malicious code remotely (from anywhere on the Internet) and gain control of the website.

The Wordfence advisory explains:

“This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php).”

The vulnerability affects all versions of the plugin up to and including version 3.2.4. Users of the affected plugin are advised to update the plugin to the latest version.

Source: https://www.searchenginejournal.com/wordpress-contact-form-7-redirection-plugin-vulnerability-hits-300k-sites/554211/

HTTP/1.1 Vulnerability Could Let Attackers Hijack Millions of Sites

Security researchers have unveiled a fundamental vulnerability in HTTP/1.1 that could allow attackers to hijack millions of websites, highlighting a persistent threat that has plagued web infrastructure for over six years despite ongoing mitigation efforts.

PortSwigger’s latest research reveals that HTTP/1.1 remains inherently insecure, routinely exposing millions of websites to hostile takeover through sophisticated HTTP desync attacks.

The cybersecurity firm has introduced several novel classes of these attacks, demonstrating critical vulnerabilities that have compromised tens of millions of websites by subverting core infrastructure within multiple Content Delivery Networks (CDNs).

Despite vendors deploying various mitigations over the past six years, researchers have consistently bypassed these protective measures.

The threat first came to prominence when PortSwigger disclosed it in 2019, yet little has fundamentally changed in addressing the root cause of the vulnerability.

Technical Root of the Problem

The core issue stems from HTTP/1.1’s fatal design flaw: the protocol allows attackers to create extreme ambiguity about where one request ends and the next request begins.

This ambiguity enables malicious actors to manipulate request boundaries, leading to request smuggling attacks that can compromise entire web applications and their underlying infrastructure.

These attacks exploit the differences in how various servers and proxy systems interpret HTTP requests, allowing attackers to inject malicious requests that appear legitimate to security systems while executing harmful operations on backend servers.

HTTP/2 and later versions eliminate this fundamental ambiguity, making desync attacks virtually impossible. However, security experts emphasize that simply enabling HTTP/2 on edge servers is insufficient.

The critical requirement is implementing HTTP/2 for upstream connections between reverse proxies and origin servers, where many vulnerabilities persist due to continued reliance on HTTP/1.1.

PortSwigger has launched a comprehensive initiative titled “HTTP/1.1 Must Die: The Desync Endgame,” urging organizations to transition away from the vulnerable protocol.

The research includes practical recommendations for immediate implementation, including enabling upstream HTTP/2 support and ensuring origin servers can handle the newer protocol.

For organizations still dependent on HTTP/1.1, researchers recommend implementing available request validation and normalization features on front-end systems, considering disabling upstream connection reuse, and actively engaging with vendors about HTTP/2 support timelines.

The cybersecurity community has developed open-source tools including HTTP Request Smuggler v3.0 and HTTP Hacker to help organizations identify and defend against these threats through recurring security scans.

This vulnerability affects a broad spectrum of web infrastructure, from individual websites to major CDN providers, highlighting the urgent need for industry-wide adoption of modern HTTP protocols to ensure web security.

Source: https://gbhackers.com/http-1-1-vulnerability/

Keeping the Web Up Under the Weight of AI Crawlers

If you run a site on the open web, chances are you’ve noticed a big increase in traffic over the past few months, whether or not your site has been getting more viewers, and you’re not alone. Operators everywhere have observed a drastic increase in automated traffic—bots—and in most cases attribute much or all of this new traffic to AI companies.

Background

AI—in particular, Large Language Models (LLMs) and generative AI (genAI)—rely on compiling as much information from relevant sources (i.e., “texts written in English” or “photographs”) as possible in order to build a functional and persuasive model that users will later interact with. While AI companies in part distinguish themselves by what data their models are trained on, possibly the greatest source of information—one freely available to all of us—is the open web.

To gather up all that data, companies and researchers use automated programs called scrapers (sometimes referred to by the more general term “bots”) to “crawl” over the links available between various webpages and save the types of information they’re tasked with as they go. Scrapers are tools with a long, and often beneficial, history: services like search engines, the Internet Archive, and all kinds of scientific research rely on them.

When scrapers are not deployed thoughtfully, however, they can contribute to higher hosting costs, lower performance, and even site outages, particularly when site operators see so many of them in operation at the same time. In the long run all this may lead to some sites shutting down rather than bearing the brunt of it.

For-profit AI companies must ensure they do not poison the well of the open web they rely on in a short-sighted rush for training data.

Bots: Read the Room

There are existing best practices those who use scrapers should follow. When bots and their operators ignore these guideposts it sends a signal to site operators, sometimes explicitly, that they can or should cut off their access, impede performance, and in the worst case it may take a site down for all users. Some companies appear to follow these practices most of the time, but we see increasing reports and evidence of new bots that don’t.

First, where possible, scrapers should follow instructions given in a site’s robots.txt file, whether those are to back off to a certain crawling rate, exclude certain paths, or not to crawl the site at all.

Second, bots should send their requests with a clearly labeled User Agent string which indicates their operator, their purpose, and a means of contact.

Third, those running scrapers should provide a process for site operators to request back-offs, rate caps, exclusions, and to report problematic behavior via the means of contact info or response forms linked via the User Agent string.

Mitigations for Site Operators

Of course, if you’re running a website dealing with a flood of crawling traffic, waiting for those bots to change their behavior for the better might not be realistic. Here are a few suggested, if imperfect, mitigations based in part on our own sometimes frustrating experiences.

First, use a caching layer. In most cases a Content Delivery Network (CDN) or an “edge platform” (essentially a newer iteration of a CDN) can provide this for you, and some services offer a free tier for non-commercial users. There are also a number of great projects if you prefer to self-host. Some of the tools we’ve used for caching include varnish, memcached, and redis.

Second, convert to static content to prevent resource-intensive database reads. In some cases this may reduce the need for caching.

Third, use targeted rate limiting to slow down bots without taking your whole site down. But know this can get difficult when scrapers try to disguise themselves with misleading User Agent strings or by spreading a fleet of crawlers out across many IP addresses.

Other mitigations such as client-side validation (e.g. CAPTCHAs or proof-of-work) and fingerprinting carry privacy and usability trade-offs, and we warn against deploying them without careful forethought.

Where Do We Go From Here?

To reiterate, whatever one’s opinion of these particular AI tools, scraping itself is not the problem. Automated access is a fundamental technique of archivists, computer scientists, and everyday users that we hope is here to stay—as long as it can be done non-destructively. However, we realize that not all implementers will follow our suggestions for bots above, and that our mitigations are both technically advanced and incomplete.

Because we see so many bots operating for the same purpose at the same time, it seems there’s an opportunity here to provide these automated data consumers with tailored data providers, removing the need for every AI company to scrape every website, seemingly, every day.

And on the operators’ end, we hope to see more web-hosting and framework technology that is built with an awareness of these issues from day one, perhaps building in responses like just-in-time static content generation or dedicated endpoints for crawlers.

Source: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/06/keeping-web-under-weight-ai-crawlers

40,000 WordPress Sites Affected by Arbitrary File Read Vulnerability in UiCore Elements WordPress Plugin

On June 13th, 2025, we received a submission for an Arbitrary File Read vulnerability in UiCore Elements, a WordPress plugin with more than 40,000 active installations. This vulnerability makes it possible for an unauthenticated attacker to read arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information. During the disclosure process, our investigation revealed that the vulnerability leveraged an underlying issue in Elementor’s import functionality.

Props to mikemyers who discovered and responsibly reported this vulnerability through the Wordfence Bug Bounty Program. This researcher earned a bounty of $617.00 for this discovery. Our mission is to secure WordPress through defense in depth, which is why we are investing in quality vulnerability research and collaborating with researchers of this caliber through our Bug Bounty Program. We are committed to making the WordPress ecosystem more secure through the detection and prevention of vulnerabilities, which is a critical element to the multi-layered approach to security.

Users of paid versions of Wordfence received a firewall rule to protect against any exploits targeting this vulnerability on June 18, 2025. Sites using the free version of Wordfence received the same protection 30 days later on July 18, 2025.

We contacted the UICORE team on June 18, 2025, and they registered on our Wordfence Vulnerability Management Portal for WordPress vendors on the next day, June 19, 2025. After receiving the full disclosure details instantly through the portal, the developer released the patch on the same day, June 19, 2025. We would like to commend the UICORE team for their prompt response and timely patch.

We urge users to update their sites with the latest patched version of UiCore Elements, version 1.3.1 at the time of this publication, as soon as possible.

Source and more details: https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2025/08/40000-wordpress-sites-affected-by-arbitrary-file-read-vulnerability-in-uicore-elements-wordpress-plugin

Post SMTP plugin flaw exposes 200K WordPress sites to hijacking attacks

More than 200,000 WordPress websites are using a vulnerable version of the Post SMTP plugin that allows hackers to take control of the administrator account.

Post SMTP is a popular email delivery plugin for WordPress that counts more than 400,000 active installations. It’s marketed as a replacement of the default ‘wp_mail()’ function that is more reliable and feature-rich.

On May 23, a security researcher reported the vulnerability to WordPress security firm PatchStack. The flaw is now identified as CVE-2025-24000 and received a medium severity score of 8.8.

The security issue affects all versions of Post SMTP up to 3.2.0 and is due to a broken access control mechanism in the plugin’s REST API endpoints, which only verified if a user was logged in, without checking their permission level.

This means that low-privileged users, such as Subscribers, could access email logs containing full email content.

On vulnerable sites, a subscriber could initiate a password reset for an Administrator account, intercept the reset email via the logs, and gain control of the account.

The plugin’s developer, Saad Iqbal, was informed about the flaw and responded with a fix for Patchstack to review on May 26.

The solution was to incorporate additional privilege checks in the ‘get_logs_permission’ function that would validate a user’s permissions before giving access to sensitive API calls.

The fix was incorporated into Post SMTP version 3.3.0, which was published on June 11.

Download statistics on WordPress.org show that less than half of the plugin’s user base (48.5%) has updated to version 3.3. This means that more than 200,000 websites are vulnerable to CVE-2025-24000.

A notable 24.2%, corresponding to 96,800 sites, still run Post SMTP versions from the 2.x branch, which is vulnerable to additional security flaws, leaving them open to attacks.

Source: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/post-smtp-plugin-flaw-exposes-200k-wordpress-sites-to-hijacking-attacks/